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The Old New (Or is it the New Old) Antitrust:
“I’m Not Dead Yet!!”
Diane P. Wood*
There was a time, long before many of the people at this Colloquium
were real grown-ups, when antitrust enforcers saw themselves as Jack
and Joan, the Giant-Killers. They went after huge business entities, called
whatever you like—Trusts, Corporations, Associations, Common Selling
Agencies—and cut them down to size. They claimed that they did so for
the good not only of consumers, but also of aspiring competitors, and
ultimately our political system as a whole. But then the Giant got smart.
Rather than fighting Jack and Joan, it persuaded them that they were on
the wrong track. Big isn’t necessarily bad, the Giant urged, quoting the
famous line from Judge Learned Hand’s Alcoa opinion, in which he
wrote:
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active
competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although
the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does
not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its
prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor,
having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.1

At the same time, the Giant brushed under the rug Judge Hand’s earlier
summary of the purpose of antitrust law. That, too, is worth repeating:
[Congress] did not condone “good trusts” and condemn “bad” ones; it
forbad all. Moreover, in so doing, it was not necessarily actuated by
economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or
moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for
his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great
mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These

* Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer
in Law, The University of Chicago Law School. The author originally presented this article on
April 26, 2019 as the keynote speech for the 19th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium for the
Loyola University Chicago’s Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies. The quotation in the title
comes from Monty Python and the Holy Grail (Python (Monty) Pictures 1975).
1. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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considerations, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of
the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.2

Roll that around in your mind for a moment. The antitrust laws are “not
necessarily actuated by economic motives alone.”3 Heresy, or the truth at
last? Is Sansa going to prevail in the end, or Cersei?4 Or someone else
altogether?
I would not claim that there is a definitive answer to the antitrust part
of that question. In recent years, the Supreme Court has frequently
ordered courts to look at the language of a statute (and only the language
of the statute, maybe with the help of contemporaneous dictionaries) in
order to discern its meaning.5 Most, though not all, of the Justices scorn
the use of legislative history; they regard a purposivist approach to
interpretation as inherently squishy; and they insist that judges cannot
“make up” laws.6
That doesn’t take one very far in antitrust. All we get from Section 1
of the Sherman Act is a ban on contracts, combinations, and conspiracies
in restraint of trade;7 Section 2 forbids monopolization, as well as
attempts and conspiracies to monopolize (the last of those being a dead
letter).8 The Clayton Act and a few special industry statutes add a bit of
clarity, but not much.9 Who knows which mergers or acquisitions are
those for which “the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create monopoly”?10 More fundamentally, what do we mean
when we say “antitrust law”? Staring at the statutory words will not
answer that question, no matter how much patience you have.
That is why, as recently as 2007, the Supreme Court conceded that the
2. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427 (emphasis added).
3. Id.
4. Two characters who, among others, compete for a kingdom in the cultural phenomenon A
Game of Thrones. See generally GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES (Bantam Books
2011) (1996).
5. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (stating that statutory
construction must adhere to the idea that the ordinary meaning of words properly reflects legislative
intent); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 376 (2013) (quoting Gross and repeating that
the ordinary meaning of words reflects the legislative intent of Congress).
6. For instance, Justice Thomas joined the late Justice Scalia in characterizing legislative history
as dangerous “swamps” in contrast to the “terra firma” of statutory language. Lawson v. FMR LLC,
134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 601
(2009) (explaining that the statute as written is often the result of compromise, and thus fails to
reflect the true intent of any legislator).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see also EARL W. KINTNER, ET. AL., 2 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 16.39 (3d
ed. 2018) (explaining that the conspiracy to monopolize offense is indistinct from a conspiracy in
restraint of trade and thus has received little attention from the courts).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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rules of statutory interpretation are different for antitrust.11 Stare decisis
also, the Court confirmed in Leegin Creative Leather Products, “is not as
significant” in the field of antitrust.12 Why? Because “[f]rom the
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute.”13 It went on in Leegin to say that “[j]ust as the common law
adapts to modern understanding and greater experience, so too does the
Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolve to meet the
dynamics of present economic conditions. The case-by-case adjudication
contemplated by the rule of reason has implemented this common-law
approach.”14
The flexibility afforded by the common-law approach does not apply
only to such questions as the types of business practices covered by the
statutes or the choice of the per se rule or the rule of reason. It applies
with equal force to the fundamental issue of the scope and purpose of the
laws. Over the nearly 130 years since the Sherman Act was passed, we
have experienced vigorous trust-busting, Depression-era market control,
aggressive measures toward international cartels, movements to control
the overall size of companies, the Chicago School, and post-Chicago (or
post-post-Chicago, by now).15 This might not be a pendulum, technically,
but one cannot deny the ebbs and flows, and most importantly the
persistence, of the debate.
I could go on: We have explored and occasionally embraced doctrines
ranging from the desirability of crisis cartels, to predatory pricing
prohibitions, to the proper understanding of price discrimination, to the
regulation of vertical distributional restraints, to conglomerate mergers,
to the need for per se rules.16 Now and then, it appears that we thought
we had finally settled on the “right” course. For example, around the
decade of the 1990s, mainstream antitrust thinking might have told a story
of a broad, nonpartisan consensus and the achievement of Antitrust
11. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
12. Id. (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
13. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 899 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S.679, 688 (1978)).
14. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 899 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435
U.S. at 688).
15. For a historical discussion of the ebb and flow of antitrust enforcement, see William E.
Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a
Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989).
16. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), overruled by
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1982) (crisis cartels); Brooke Grp. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (predatory pricing); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical restraints of distribution); FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (conglomerate mergers); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493
U.S. 411 (1990) (per se rules).
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Nirvana. But it is getting harder and harder to insist that our 1990
understanding of antitrust represented Final Wisdom. It is just possible
that we have not.
And there lies the rub. One does not have to look far in today’s world
to find sincere concern over the concentration of economic power in the
hands of only a few giant companies, whether they are the tech
companies, the energy companies, office retailers, banks, or others. You
have only to look at the newsfeed on your cellphone (or if you are really
old-fashioned, the TV news) to see people across the political spectrum
expressing fears that these huge companies are not only exercising market
power in the economic sense, but that they are also dominating political
debate.17 A great deal of the backlash against Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission stemmed from this concern.18 But if we were to
step into our Time Machine and visit the years and months leading up to
the enactment of the Sherman Act, we would find much the same
concern: that huge “trusts,” as they probably would have said, will have
an outsized influence in the United States political system.19 And that
idea leads one very quickly into the debate over whether Big is Bad. Other
questions include these: what is the threshold for concern (or put more
formally, at what level of market power should the law begin to
intervene); do antitrust enforcers (whoever they may be) have the
knowledge and the tools to intervene successfully (that is, not be guilty
of too many Type 1 errors); and what reason is there to think that we can
somehow craft an effective law now, when all previous efforts along
these lines have failed?
17. See Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Breaking Up Tech Giants Like Amazon
and Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/us/politics/
elizabeth-warren-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/6P42-PSFS] (describing Senator Elizabeth
Warren’s legislative solution to breaking up Big Tech companies); Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Trump
says administration is looking into antitrust violations by Amazon, other tech giants, CNBC (Nov.
5, 2018, 2:20 PM) https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/05/trump-looking-into-antitrust-violationsagainst-amazon-other-tech-giants.html [https://perma.cc/HUT6-5EJ7] (detailing President
Trump’s recent comments about looking into potential antitrust violations committed by Big Tech
companies).
18. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Years later, Justice Ginsburg
opined, “the notion that we have all the democracy that money can buy strays so far from what our
democracy is supposed to be.” Jeffrey Rosen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Is an American Hero, NEW
(Sept.
28,
2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/119578/ruth-bader-ginsburg-interviewretirement-feminists-jazzercise [https://perma.cc/J6TX-9U39]. The rest of the backlash to Citizens
United took issue with the Court’s assumption that huge amounts of money sloshing around the
political system were not likely to create problems of corruption. That topic, however, lies well
beyond the scope of this Colloquium.
19. See Jennifer Szalai, A Look at Competition in Business Urges Us to Think Small, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/books/review-curse-of-bigness-antitrustlaw-tim-wu.html [https://perma.cc/KQH5-5D6Q] (discussing Tim Wu’s new book: The Curse of
Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age).
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I wish I could answer those questions for you, but regrettably, apart
from saying that I agree with those who have argued that we have come
to accept too much market power in our Section 7 and Section 2 cases, as
well as our Section 1 rule of reason cases,20 I do not have quite that much
chutzpah. What I can do is take a few minutes to talk about one problem
that seems increasingly prevalent in the modern market: the bottleneck
monopoly. My suspicion is that the obituary for that part of antitrust was
prematurely written. I’ll explain why, and I’ll also take the reckless step
of saying that we might need to resuscitate the old essential facilities
doctrine, if we hope to address some of the most pressing current and
foreseeable problems for competition in the global market.
Once upon a time, antitrust law addressed the special problems that
exist when a single firm (or a coordinated group of firms) controls a
bottleneck facility, and through that control, the firm or group is able
somehow to harm competition. The phrase “essential facilities doctrine”
arose to describe this insight.21 It conjured up images of the vital nature
of the asset in question, and it implied that something more than an
ordinary refusal to deal by a monopolist or cartel was at hand.
Applications of the doctrine were not common, yet they also were not
hard to find for the first eight decades of the twentieth century.22 That
changed in the 1980s, when new economic approaches to antitrust led
many to question the intellectual basis and the utility of this doctrine.
Reputable scholars called for severe limitations or even abandonment.23
This movement reached its culmination with the Supreme Court’s 2004
decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP,24 where the Court threw a bucketful of ice over the notion
of an “essential facilities” doctrine, though it conceded that it had “no

20. See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 275 n.280 (2017).
21. See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520 (10th Cir.
1984) (describing Terminal Railroad’s insight into the bottleneck effect), aff’d, 472 U.S. 585
(1985).
22. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348 n.5 (1963) (noting that withholding
valuable services important to effective competition with others sufficed to create a Sherman Act
violation); Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass'ns, 754 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding a trade
association’s withholding of certification in a discriminatory manner such that they were not
equally available was an antitrust violation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854 (1987); Vandervelde v. Put
& Call Brokers & Dealers Ass’n., 344 F. Supp. 118, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding an association
that did not allow access to its exchange forum on an equal basis violated antitrust laws).
23. See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Rethinking the Monopolist’s Duty To Deal: A Legal and
Economic Critique of the Doctrine of “Essential Facilities”, 74 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1988)
(arguing that the essential facilities doctrine, presently applied, is inefficient and advocates for a
new approach based on consumer welfare standards).
24. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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need either to recognize it or to repudiate it [t]here.”25 At the very
moment Trinko appeared, however, digital broadband, social media, and
online markets were exploding.
I will briefly trace the rise, fall, and future of the essential facilities
doctrine. After speculating about why this notion arose to begin with, I’ll
comment on the nearly universal criticism that became for a time the
common wisdom. The comments that the Supreme Court made in its
Trinko decision are, against that backdrop, hardly surprising. But this
may have been a quintessential case of bad timing. Just as the Court was
foreshadowing the death of any distinct “essential facilities” doctrine, the
“new economy” was coming into its own.26 Competition now takes place
in cyberspace, more than in factories or even service markets. Tactics
have changed, the pace of change has sped up, path dependence pops up
everywhere, and new and creative ways to distort the competitive process
have arisen. We talk incessantly about platforms, whether one or twosided.27 A revamped essential facilities doctrine may help to identify
exclusionary practices that are inconsistent with the antitrust laws—
practices that can be understood and controlled within the limitations of
the courts, to which private parties and governments alike must turn in
the end for antitrust enforcement.
Let’s start by recalling why the essential facilities doctrine arose in the
first place. During the period when the Supreme Court had direct review
over most antitrust cases, thanks to the old Expediting Act,28 United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis reached the Court.29
The case concerned the vital linkage of the United States rail system over
the Mississippi River in St. Louis. The United States had sued thirty-eight
corporate and individual defendants for violations of the Sherman Act,
and the lower court had dismissed the action by a 2-2 vote.30 The
principal defendant was the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis,
which the defendants had formed for the purpose of creating a unified
system for these railroad crossings.31 The Court noted that the
25. Id. at 411.
26. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001).
27. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280–81, 2285–88 (2018)
(distinguishing between one- and two-sided markets); David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of
Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. REG. 325, 336–39 (2003) (comparing multi-sided
platform markets with single-sided markets).
28. See Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), amended by Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, § 4 (noting that this appellate jurisdiction was
substantially restricted in 1974 by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act).
29. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
30. Id. at 390–91.
31. Id. at 391.
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Association’s properties “included the great union station, the only
existing railroad bridge—the Eads or St. Louis bridge—and every
connecting or terminal company by means of which that bridge could be
used by railroads terminating on either side of the river.” 32 For a time,
competition existed, furnished by a ferry company and another toll bridge
(the Merchants’ Bridge) that was open to every railroad on equal terms.33
Although this resulted in some duplication of facilities, it also provided
modest competition for each facility. 34 In order to squelch that
competition, the Association acquired a controlling share of the stock in
the Merchants’ Bridge, its related companies, and the ferry company,
thereby combining the three independent terminal systems into one.35
Without using the term “essential facility,” the Supreme Court
concluded that this unification of the terminal facilities at such a critical
point on the Mississippi violated the Sherman Act.36 It denied, however,
that its holding meant that “the unification of the terminal facilities of a
great city where many railroad systems center is, under all circumstances
and conditions, a combination in restraint of trade or commerce.”37
Compatibility with the statute depended also, it said, on the extent of the
control secured, the intent of the parties, the methods they used, and the
manner in which the control was asserted.38 With that in mind, the Court
turned to a consideration of the “natural conditions” affecting railroads in
St. Louis.39 None of the twenty-four rail lines converging on the city
passed through it; half had their termini on the Illinois side of the river,
half on the Missouri side.40 And the topography of the St. Louis area
(described in detail by the Court) made it, “as a practical matter,
impossible for any railroad company to pass through, or even enter St.
Louis, so as to be within reach of its industries or commerce, without
using the facilities entirely controlled by the terminal company.”41
The Association conceded that it had this monopoly, but it tried to
persuade the Court that it was a natural monopoly that could not be
avoided.42 The Court was not moved, particularly because the history of

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 394–95.
Id. at 395–96.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 397.
Id.
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the Association showed that competition was possible.43 It was also
significant, in the Court’s view, that the Association was not an
independent corporation, but instead was simply the vehicle through
which the twenty-four railroads were cooperating.44 What was necessary,
given what the Court regarded as the highly unusual (if not unique)
physical situation, was either competition or a unified system of terminals
that was “[an] impartial agent of all” and that operated, for all practical
purposes, as a public utility.45 Since neither existed, the Court found a
violation of both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.46
Interestingly, it rejected the government’s requested remedy of
dissolution and ordered instead that the parties revise the Association’s
agreement in a way that would eliminate its anticompetitive effects.47 The
Association would have to be open on equal terms to all; the facilities
would have to be open to non-members on “just and reasonable terms”;
no company could be restricted in its use of the terminal facilities; billing
practices would have to be reformed; special charges for essentially local
traffic would have to be eliminated; and procedural safeguards would
have to be added, including one permitting resort to the district court if
necessary.48
The concepts at play in Terminal Railroad lay fallow for many years,
perhaps because most instances of “essential facilities” occurred in
regulated industries, and the responsible regulatory agency was handling
issues relating to access, pricing, and dispute resolution.49 They
reappeared more than three decades later, in 1945, in Associated Press v.
United States.50 Associated Press presented a distinctly different set of
facts. Rather than topography that had existed since the time of the last
Ice Age,51 more conventional constraints were at issue. The publishers of
more than 1200 newspapers had jointly created an association for
collecting, assembling, and disseminating the news.52 Members paid a

43. Id. at 398.
44. Id. at 399.
45. Id. at 405.
46. Id. at 409.
47. Id. at 411.
48. Id. at 411–13.
49. Gerber, supra note 23, at 1087–88 (discussing the essential facilities doctrine and
advocating for consumer welfare standards).
50. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
51. See Kim Ann Zimmermann, Pleistocene Epoch: Facts About the Last Ice Age, LIVE
SCIENCE (Aug. 29, 2017) https://www.livescience.com/40311-pleistocene-epoch.html [https://
perma.cc/8SHY-JYEE] (discussing the Pleistocene Epoch, which started around 2.6 million years
ago and lasted until 11,700 years ago).
52. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 3–4.
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fee designed to cover costs for that service.53 Competitors of the member
newspapers were not eligible for membership, nor could members sell
news to non-members in advance of publication.54 The United States
sued the AP on the theory that these restraints (contained in the
association’s bylaws) were unlawful under Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.55 Lack of access to the AP’s news, the complaint said and
the Court agreed, “hindered and restrained the sale of interstate news to
non-members who competed with members.”56
The Court rejected a number of defenses, including one based on the
right of each business to decide with whom it would deal, and one
premised on the empirical assertion that sufficient competition existed
from other news agencies.57 The former, the Court said, failed to take into
account the fact that the Sherman Act itself embodies a restriction on
business autonomy if the actor is a monopolist or an unlawful
combination.58 The latter, the Court thought, was not supported by the
record. It noted in this respect that morning newspapers controlling 96
percent of total circulation in the United States were AP members.59 It
seems to have conceded that AP membership was not strictly
indispensable for participation in the news business, but it rejected an
“indispensability” test as something that would “fly in the face of the
language of the Sherman Act and all of our previous interpretations of
it.”60 This is in some tension with Terminal Railroad, you will note, but
the majority never mentioned that opinion.61
Associated Press did have at least one thing in common with Terminal
Railroad: like the earlier case, it did not mark the beginning of a robust
development of an essential facilities doctrine. Instead, another twentyeight years went by before the Supreme Court put in place the third leg
of the stool: Otter Tail Power Company v. United States.62 While
Terminal Railroad did no more than allude to the idea of regulated
industries, Otter Tail unambiguously involved the way in which antitrust
53. Id. at 10–11, 11 n.5.
54. Id. at 10–11.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id. at 14–15, 17–18.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 18.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 25 (Douglas, J., concurring). It appeared only in Justice Douglas’s concurrence as an
aside, id., and in Justice Roberts’s partial dissent in a string-cite in a footnote, id. at 38 n.8 (Roberts,
J., dissenting), and in Justice Murphy’s dissent as an example of true dominance, id. at 55 (Murphy,
J., dissenting).
62. See generally Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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law intersects with regulation. Once again, the United States brought the
suit, based on the theory that Otter Tail (an electric utility) had attempted
to monopolize and monopolized the retail distribution of electric power
in its service area.63 It did so, the government charged, by refusing to sell
power at wholesale to proposed municipal systems where it had been
selling power at retail, instead refusing to wheel power to those systems
at all.64 The district court ruled in favor of the government, and Otter Tail
appealed.65
Although the Court began by reiterating the unremarkable notion that
repeals by implication are disfavored, this would not have been necessary
if it had not accepted that Otter Tail’s actions raised antitrust concerns.66
The Court announced that the Federal Power Act (“FPC”) did not entirely
displace the antitrust laws, and so there was room for antitrust liability
despite the fact that Otter Tail’s prices and terms of service were
regulated.67 With that established, the Court turned to Otter Tail’s
unilateral refusal to deal with the municipal systems. It held that Otter
Tail used its monopoly power over transmission to foreclose or destroy
competition at the retail level in the affected municipalities. 68 Notably,
the court relied on the assumption—widely accepted during this period—
that power transmission was a natural monopoly and thus a suitable
subject of regulation.69 Use of monopoly power in that way, it said, is
forbidden by the “attempt to monopolize” clause of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.70 At the same time, the Court recognized that the district
court had properly taken into account Otter Tail’s assertion that
compulsory interconnection or wheeling might threaten its overall
system.71 It did so by making future connection subject to the approval
of the FPC, and by retaining jurisdiction over the case as a whole.72
Once again, the Court did not speak in terms of an “essential facility.”
Outside observers, however, linked together these three cases and
discerned in them a broad principle.73 Even though, in a capitalist system,
private actors—even monopolists—do not ordinarily have any obligation
63. Id. at 368.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 368–69.
66. Id. at 372.
67. Id. at 373–74.
68. Id. at 377.
69. Id. at 383 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 377.
71. Id. at 381.
72. Id. at 376–77.
73. Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From Terminal Railroad to
Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 563–64 (2009).
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to share their assets or facilities with all outsiders, holders of “essential
facilities” are an exception to that rule.74 Sometimes, even though no
formal regulatory structure requires nondiscriminatory access, such
access must be provided.75 That duty arises if and only if several criteria
are met: first, the facility must be a necessary input to participation in a
market (that is, it is “essential,” or it creates a “bottleneck”); second, it
must not be practically or reasonably possible to duplicate the essential
facility; third, the holder of the facility must be using it either to harm
competition with a potential entrant into its own market, or (more
problematically) to leverage its economic power from one market into the
adjacent market for which the facility is needed; and fourth, it must be
possible to devise some kind of access scheme for outsiders.76
Many questions arose about the scope of the newly identified doctrine.
How was one to distinguish between an ordinary refusal to deal by a firm
(or group of firms) with market power and a decision to deprive others of
access to an essential facility? To what extent was the real problem rooted
in government regulation? If there is a problem, does the solution lie in
the federal courts, or does this reveal a need for legislation and the
creation of a regulatory structure? Does the imposition of a duty to deal
on the holder of an essential facility interfere in an undesirable way with
the market mechanism, and thus over the long run actually impede
competition by dampening market signals suggesting the need for
investment in substitutes? And finally, will false positives overwhelm
any benefit that recognition of this doctrine may yield?
No perfect answers to any of those questions were ever offered. The
courts occasionally saw cases that seemed to fit the criteria of the
essential facilities doctrine, and even more occasionally, they applied it
to require the holder of the facility to provide nondiscriminatory access.
But many of those applications were contestable at best. For example, is
a football stadium “essential,” or is it just expensive to find the land to
build another stadium?77 Is a flour mill that would be very expensive to
replace “essential”?78 These and other examples are certainly troubling.
In time, growing unease with the doctrine burst out into the open. In
1990, Professor Philip Areeda published an article whose title spoke
volumes: “Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting

74. Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 445–46 (2002).
75. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1102–03 (7th Cir. 1983).
76. Id. at 1132–33. This is roughly the way that the Seventh Circuit summarized these ideas.
77. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992–93 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
78. Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Principles.”79 The topic had become popular at the time because the
deregulation movement was in full swing, in the wake of airline
deregulation under President Carter and expanded deregulation initiatives
under President Reagan.80 Areeda thought that “essential facilities” was
an example of “judging by catch-phrase,” and he was deeply skeptical
about the results.81 And he was right to worry. He noted, correctly, that
the facility in Terminal Railroad came about because of concerted action
by competitors, and thus, was not a good fit for a rule against single-firm
behavior.82 He warned, quite sensibly, that the antitrust “essential
facilities” doctrine would become meaningless if “anything one has that
another wants may be called an ‘essential facility.’”83 He also cautioned
against any doctrine that threatened to turn federal district courts into
public-utility commissions, charged with on-going supervision of entire
industries.84 In an effort to cabin but not abolish the doctrine, Areeda
suggested six limiting principles:
 There is no general duty to share; compulsory access is required
only in exceptional circumstances.
 A single-firm facility is “essential” only when it is both critical
for the plaintiff’s vitality, and the plaintiff is essential for
competition in the market.
 There should be no forced dealing unless it predictably will
substantially improve market competition by reducing price or
increasing output or innovation.
 Denial of access is never per se unlawful.
 The defendant’s intention is not central; what is critical is
whether the means of exclusion are improper.
 There should be no duty to deal that cannot be explained, and
no duty to deal that requires extensive supervision by the
court.85
Another noted antitrust scholar, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, joined
Areeda’s position and raised the ante. In his treatise, Federal Antitrust
Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, he pulled no punches.86
79. See generally Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990).
80. Michael Collins, Did Deregulation Work?, INDUSTRY WEEK (Oct. 26, 2016), https://
www.industryweek.com/regulations/did-deregulation-work [https://perma.cc/K63G-74NE].
81. Areeda, supra note 79, at 841 (discussing generally how the essential facilities doctrine is
often expansively and mechanically applied by inexperienced judges with little regard to policy).
82. Id. at 844.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 853.
85. Id. at 852–53.
86. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
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Here is how the section introducing the doctrine begins:
The so-called “essential facility” doctrine is one of the most
troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman § 2
liability. The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if
it were jettisoned, with a little fine tuning of the general doctrine of
refusal to deal to fill any gaps.87

Hovenkamp identified several critical questions that he found to be
seriously under-theorized: “1) what is a qualifying ‘essential facility’? 2)
does the duty to deal extend only to rivals, or also to vertically related
firms or others? 3) when is the refusal to deal unjustified?”88
In the face of this criticism, few defenders of “essential facilities”
could be found in the United States,89 although interestingly, competition
laws of other countries continued to borrow and apply it.90 That is where
matters stood when Trinko reached the Supreme Court.91
Trinko may come to be seen as a victim of bad timing. The case
involved the way in which the antitrust laws relate to the ambitious
deregulation of the telecommunications industry that was accomplished
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.92 The Telecommunications Act
imposed special duties on so-called Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(ILECs); those duties were designed to facilitate the entry of new,
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers.93 Among other things, ILECs
were required to interconnect with competitors at reasonable prices, and
they were required to provide access to individual elements of their
networks on an unbundled basis.94 In return, ILECs such as Verizon
obtained the opportunity (theretofore restricted) to enter the long-distance
market.95
The litigation arose when a customer of AT&T, Trinko’s Law Offices,
filed an antitrust class action in the district court asserting that Verizon
was not complying in a variety of ways with its obligations to provide
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (5th ed. 2016). The language quoted has appeared unchanged
through several editions of the book.
87. Id. at 410.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the
Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1824 n.4 (2007).
90. Spencer Weber Waller & William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 741–42 (2010).
91. I put to one side the intervening decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), even though it could be regarded as another example of a facility made
essential by geography.
92. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 5 (1996).
93. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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fair access to its rivals.96 The district court dismissed the complaint, but
the Second Circuit reversed for further proceedings.97 At that point, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question whether it was
error to reinstate the antitrust claims.98
The Court acknowledged that the Telecommunications Act did not
effect a wholesale repeal of the antitrust laws.99 To the contrary, section
601(b)(1) of the Act said “nothing in this Act or the amendments made
by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”100 Nevertheless, the Court said,
“just as the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy existing antitrust
standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond existing antitrust
standards; that would be equally inconsistent with the saving clause’s
mandate that nothing in the Act ‘modif[ies], impair[s], or supersede[s]
the applicability’ of the antitrust laws.”101 It then concluded that the
various interconnection and unbundling duties at issue went well beyond
anything mandated by the antitrust laws and thus could not support an
antitrust claim.102 In the course of doing so, it offered the following cold
remarks about essential facilities:
We conclude that Verizon’s alleged insufficient assistance in the
provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under
this Court’s existing refusal-to-deal precedents. This conclusion would
be unchanged even if we considered to be established law the “essential
facilities” doctrine crafted by some lower courts, under which the Court
of Appeals concluded respondent’s allegations might state a claim. . . .
We have never recognized such a doctrine, . . . and we find no need
either to recognize it or to repudiate it here. It suffices for present
purposes to note that the indispensable requirement for invoking the
doctrine is the unavailability of access to the “essential facilities”;
where access exists, the doctrine serves no purpose. Thus, it is said that
essential facility claims should . . . be denied where a state or federal
agency has effective power to compel sharing and to regulate its scope
and terms.103

Not surprisingly, a great number of people wondered whether this
passage should be read as a diplomatic burial of the essential-facilities

96. Id. at 404.
97. Id. at 405.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 406.
100. Id. (quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat.
5 (1996)).
101. Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 410.
103. Id. at 410–11 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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idea.104
I am here to say that it is premature to publish the obituary. Why might
that be? Since the time that Trinko appeared, the debate about the way in
which the antitrust laws function (or should function) in the digital
economy has been intensifying.105 There are at least three schools of
thought about the way antitrust relates to this new type of economy: (1)
it can’t keep up and so should be abandoned, either through judicial
interpretation or legislation;106 (2) the digital economy simply presents a
new set of problems for antitrust, but the law and its analytic
methodologies are adaptable enough to apply to serious distortions of
competition and consequent harm to consumer welfare in the nouveau
monde;107 and (3) as a concept antitrust may retain some importance and
so should escape repeal, but the risk of false positives is very great in the
digital world, and so the presumption should be strongly in favor of
laissez-faire.108
Human nature has not changed, even though people may be spending
inordinate amounts of time on their digital devices. Standard antitrust
doctrine offers many ways in which to exonerate potentially useful
business behavior: perhaps the firm or firms have no market power;
perhaps entry is easy; perhaps a collective arrangement promises to create
efficiencies; and so on.109 Given this fact, position number two has the
greatest appeal for me. As soon as we start putting a thumb on the scale
for certain types of markets, we risk the benefits of competition in those
markets.
I am not the first to suggest that the essential facilities doctrine may
have an important and largely unanticipated role to play, for instance, in
the digital broadband market. Many have argued that the doctrine can
104. See Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481, 529
(2007) (“While not stating it in so many words, Trinko may have effectively brought the era of
essential facility claims in the US to an end . . . .”).
105. Maxwell Meadows, The Essential Facilities Doctrine in Information Economies:
Illustrating Why the Antitrust Duty to Deal is Still Necessary in the New Economy, 25 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 795, 802 (2015) (“Scholars debate whether these platforms
should be analyzed under the net-neutrality framework, antitrust tying analysis, or the essential
facilities as discussed here.”).
106. Charles Duhigg, The Case Against Google, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/02/20/magazine/the-case-against-google.html [https://perma.cc/XV7J-MVSS].
107. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, FTC, Remarks Before the Georgetown
University Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: Antitrust Enforcement in the Digital Age
(Sept. 12, 2017).
108. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2019).
109. See generally Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & The FTC, available
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y6QB-LVX5].
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usefully apply, without triggering the objections that have been raised in
the past, for markets in which there are substantial network effects, where
it is also true that the marginal cost of using the bottleneck facility or
product or service (once created) is close to zero.110
This does not fully answer the institutional-capacity objection, which
is a serious one. I know few judges who want to become business
regulators. Nonetheless, there are ever more sophisticated economic tools
that help us detect undesirable market power, and there are ways of
structuring remedial decrees that avoid this evil. One could imagine, for
example, transferring any case that required ongoing supervision to the
Federal Trade Commission, which is better suited for such action than the
courts. Consent degrees in the information economy already commonly
call for open architecture; they already require sellers to offer products in
both a bundled and an unbundled format. These types of orders do not
require judicial price surveillance, and they have helped to keep
competition and innovation strong.
Predatory pricing offers a useful comparison, as it is another possibly
abusive exclusionary practice. It normally appears as a form of singlefirm exclusionary behavior.111 The idea is that the predatorily low prices
ultimately harm consumers if a firm with market power destroys a
budding rival by pricing so low that the rival cannot survive and
competition disappears.112 For a time this was a recognized theory,
occasionally applied in litigation and otherwise serving as a deterrent to
this form of exclusion.113 Again, however, in the mid-1980s mainstream
antitrust thinkers began to accept the argument that it was actually
impossible to carry off a successful predatory pricing strategy. 114 In those
few cases where someone came close, these people argued, the market
would correct the ultimate monopoly faster than antitrust litigation

110. Lao, supra note 73, at 593 (discussing how the essential facilities doctrine should increase
innovation in network industries with strong network effects because opening access would
encourage competition from smaller rivals in secondary markets).
111. Ari Lehman, Eliminating the Below-Cost Pricing Requirement From Predatory Pricing
Claims, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 343, 347 (“Predatory pricing is one means of establishing a
monopoly. By lowering prices to the point that all competitors leave the market, a predator can
achieve monopoly status.”).
112. Id. at 348.
113. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597–98
(1986) (finding that summary judgment for defendant-petitioner would be proper absent evidence
of a pricing conspiracy); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 228 (1st Cir.
1983) (affirming district court decision for defendant when manufacturer did not price below cost).
114. Remarks During the Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 12 (Feb. 4, 1987) (statement of Terry
Calvani, Commissioner, FTC).
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could.115 But then things changed again, as game theory and other
behavioral theories revealed that it overstates matters considerably to say
that predatory pricing is impossible.116 Instead, although it is important
to be cautious before punishing a firm for low prices,117 both price and
non-price exclusionary behavior does occur and is worthy of
condemnation when it does.118
We can see that recognition of an anticompetitive practice sometimes
has preceded the formal, rigorous economic explanation of why exactly
that practice is capable of harming competition and consumer welfare.
My suggestion is that the essential facilities doctrine or idea, may belong
in that category. More careful study of the markets in other countries in
which it has been applied might yield interesting results. In addition,
closer examination of the numerous suggestions urging the mandating of
access to essential telecom and internet resources, as well as mandating
unbundled access, is worth undertaking.
This must be done surgically, not with a meat cleaver. The empirical
approach is not well suited to per se rules, and some of the pessimism
about regulating exclusionary practices that arose during the mid- to late
twentieth century may have stemmed from overuse of those rules.
Although we can all chant in unison that “the antitrust laws are for the
protection of competition, not competitors,”119 we need to remember that
there will be no competition without competitors. When it comes to
exclusionary practices, we may have thrown the baby out with the
bathwater. Oliver Wendell Holmes was right when he said “[t]he life of
the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” 120 I would suggest
that the same is true for antitrust. Our forebears were right to recognize
that a vibrant economy that does not place undue market power into a
tiny number of hands is essential not just for economic markets but also
for political stability. We should get back to work and find ways to
implement that insight.
115. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 26 (1984)
(“Either the business losses during the period of aggression will act as the penalty, or the conduct
will turn out to be efficient.”).
116. Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 54 (2005).
117. Kara E. Harchuck, Microsoft IV: The Dangers to Innovation Posed by the Irresponsible
Application of a Rule of Reason Analysis to Product Design Claims, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 395, 428–
29 (2009) (discussing case law where the Supreme Court urges caution when condemning low
prices).
118. Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt: To
Save it, Let it Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1067 (1999).
119. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis omitted)
("Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of
competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such
combinations may tend to lessen competition.”).
120. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

